



The end of an era? Challenges for ACP-EU relations in 2010

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This Briefing paper previews some of the headline debates expected in 2010 and sketches the backdrop against which these will unfold. The aim is not so much to predict outcomes, but to situate and frame the EU debates on development cooperation so as to enable as wide a group of stakeholders as possible to follow and participate in them. This year's Challenges paper includes contributions from some of ECDPM's African partners' as well as results from an ECDPM opinion survey on EU-ACP relations. The poll covered issues such as regional priorities for 2010, the role of emerging actors and the future of the ACP Group.²

Introduction

In a communiqué to mark the coming into force of the EU's Lisbon Treaty, the ACP Group suggested this *'could spell the end of the era when Europe considered the fight against poverty a priority'* and expressed fears about *'the disappearance of the reference to the ACP countries from the Lisbon Treaty.'*³ While this may be reading too much into a small textual change to the Treaty of the EU, the ACP may well have a point if one looks more widely at the cautious manner in which the EU has been responding to recent global events.

Rising oil and food prices and a deeply shaken global financial sector have brought a global crisis that has overshadowed international relations for the past two years, erecting an impossible backdrop for development efforts. Despite few signs of recovery, the longer-term effects of the crisis are not yet fully apparent and it is increasingly clear that the crisis has had a very serious effect on ACP countries, which is likely to worsen. The November 2009 World Food Summit recognised that the number of hungry in the world has risen to over 1 billion and the UN Special Rapporteur on Food Security warned that 'the current

multilateral trade system needs to be fixed' if it is not going to make the global food security crisis worse⁴. In 2010 the EU should therefore take the initiative and push for a far bolder and more integrated approach to tackling global problems; a rethink of the role of development cooperation in this effort; as well as a fundamental renewal of global governance systems that takes into account the interest of Southern partners. In particular, the EU needs to lead the way in maintaining the upward trend of its ODA so as to meet agreed targets, as well as find new and additional funds to meet the climate change challenge.

The ratification of the Lisbon Treaty does mean that within the European Union, 2010 will be a year of institutional changes and particularly so in EU external action. The routine changes of political leadership will this time be accompanied by new institutional arrangements, such as the establishment of an EU diplomatic corps, the EEAS. These changes will undoubtedly take time and slow things down. So for Europe's partners in the ACP, they represent both an obstacle to be overcome and managed and an opportunity to build new partnerships. But they are also a unique opportunity

for EU external action to construct the necessary integrated approach to tackling the widening global agenda in a way that is coherent with development objectives. Key questions therefore include: will the changes produce real progress on PCD? Will the lessons from the EU's many years of development cooperation experience be effectively used across the board in all EU external action? In brief will development, as a policy sector be able to maximise its leverage in future EU international cooperation?

WHAT IS PCD?

Development aid on its own cannot eradicate poverty. It is therefore essential to ensure that other EU policies with an external impact do not undermine but rather support international development efforts.

This is PCD or *policy coherence for development*. It seeks to strengthen the synergies between development and non-development policies and ensure that development objectives are properly taken into account beyond development cooperation.

I. The global crisis and its impact on North-South relations

The financial crisis led to a contraction of more than 2.5% in global GDP,⁵ together with a sharp decline in the volume of world trade.⁶ Though the ACP was initially less affected, the diminution in trade volumes, investment flows and remittances, together with declining and highly volatile commodity prices, slowed the economic progress recorded in recent years in most ACP countries, and exacerbated poverty. While most EU countries implemented large economic stimulus packages, the scope for such measures in the ACP was limited – with very few exceptions such as Mauritius. As economic uncertainties continue into 2010, the situation of ACP countries and their financial flows requires continued close monitoring and decisive action, including ensuring that aid flows are maintained.

Changing global governance

There are increasing calls for a fundamental review of global governance systems and efforts to ensure that institutions such as the IMF, World Bank, WTO and UN Security Council are more responsive and accountable to developing country priorities. One positive outcome of the financial crisis has been the new, albeit still tentative, emphasis on the G20 instead of the G8 as a forum for strengthening global financial and economic governance. Of course the G8 has not yet been completely dropped and there are also criticisms that can be levelled at the new framework, but particularly in terms of the way it involves the BRIC countries, it does provide a more useful 'task force' of key players. However, as UN Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon reminded the G20 in Pittsburgh in September 2009, the UN General Assembly remains the only forum in which

all countries, including the least developed, are represented. Particularly important is the all too slowly evolving interaction between the G20 and the IMF to reform its governance and redefine its role in the international finance system.

It is still early days for this new focus on the G20 and so its progress has to be watched and carefully nurtured in 2010, at the next G20 Leaders meeting following the G8 in June in Canada, and at the regular G20 in South Korea later in the year. The BRIC countries are playing a dynamising role in reshaping global governance. The group became more organised in 2009 with a first summit in Russia in June that focused on the reform of the international financial system and its institutions. Their next summit will be hosted by Brazil in 2010. They equally see a leadership role for themselves among the wider group of 'new donors', which Russia hopes to host at a conference in Moscow in February 2010.⁷

The United States and China remain the two key players in the G20. Another 18 nations may be members, but their influence will inevitably wane as China's economic strength grows. This rebalancing will continue in 2010, due to the declining growth rates in high-income countries. Although China's growth has also dipped, it is still rising more rapidly than most other countries in the world and its economy seems likely to overtake Japan's as the second largest in the world in the next year.⁸

Inevitably this has implications for the other G20 countries, which will need to work together in alliances if they are to have any impact on decisions. This is most obviously true for the EU members and the BRICs, both groups with access to the G20. But it also holds for developing countries outside the framework. Africa has only one nation in the G20, South Africa, and a concerted effort would have to be made to get real representation for the whole continent. A European decision to agree to

single EU representation in the G20 would be a bold move that could open the way for AU membership as well.

Financing for development

Although the global crisis at first affected industrialised countries, its widening impact has also been felt in the developing world through increasing commodity prices, falling demand for raw materials, the lack of availability of credit and through links between ACP and Western financial institutions. Economic growth in Africa is expected to drop to 2.8% in 2009, after rates greater than 5% in the last few years. The AfDB and the OECD argue that next year may bring some recovery, and this should happen faster in Africa than in developed countries.⁹ However, inflation continues to be a problem in much of Africa, mainly due to rising world market prices for oil and fertilisers, and as already mentioned, the prospects of a serious food crisis for a growing number of poor people are very real.

Donor commitments to raise ODA levels are under strain due to the financial crisis. A number of EU member states have so far managed to safeguard their planned increases, but others not. Moreover, as developed economies contract their ODA targets in terms of percentages of GNI, absolute volumes will certainly go down. The OECD DAC still estimates that ODA levels will increase in 2010, but not as much as promised at the 2002 Monterrey Conference on Financing for Development. For the EU, the interim ODA target for 2010 is 0.56% of GNI, which at the time of the Gleneagles G8 summit in 2008 would have meant €67 billion for development assistance. According to the latest (European) Commission¹⁰ assessment of progress towards this target, by 2010 the EU will have reached only 0.48% amounting to a total ODA of €58.6 billion. However, even if the target is reached, ODA levels in real terms will be down.

September European Parliament confirms Barroso as President of the European Commission G20 Meeting, Pittsburgh 2 nd bi-annual PCD Report published	October Irish Referendum on Lisbon Treaty JAES Financing Seminar 13 th EU-Africa Ministerial Troika	November Global Forum for Migration and Development, Athens GAERC with development focus Council decisions on Council President and High Representative	December Lisbon Treaty enters into force, High Representative takes office UN Climate Change Conference, COP 15, Copenhagen
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2009

Given this growing uncertainty over ODA the debate on other sources of development finance is acquiring heightened importance. There is already a recognition that foreign direct investment and migrant remittances play an important role and the debate on financing climate change has explored how to mobilise the private sector even further through the creation of carbon markets. The uncertainty on ODA therefore puts an additional premium on the EC/EU to intensify its efforts to develop effective policies in these alternative areas. Equally there is scope to follow the lead of the Development Committee of the European Parliament,¹¹ and work with ACP countries to address other financial issues that have too long been neglected such as domestic resource mobilisation, tax havens and illicit capital flight which cause huge revenue losses for developing countries.

A key consideration for the ACP is whether the EU will come out of this economic downturn before the negotiation of the next European Development Fund (EDF). There is still some margin for this, as the current 10th EDF lasts until end 2013. However the debate will start earlier in 2011 or even 2010 as proposals for the next multi-annual EU Budget or 'financial perspectives' are prepared. At their L'Aquila Summit in July 2009, G8 leaders emphasised the need for a strong global partnership in economic governance, including through an ambitious and balanced conclusion of the Doha Round,¹² added to their pledge to mobilise US \$20 billion for global food security.¹³

II. Global initiatives

In the past decade, a series of global challenges have come to dominate the international agenda and change the way many actors think about development cooperation. Of course it is still possible to focus on a narrow development aid agenda that prioritises the MDGs above all

else, but increasingly many development actors see their most important role as contributing a development perspective to the way broader global challenges are tackled. Climate change, migration, peace and security, global governance (including the governance of the aid system) and the financial crisis are all examples of global challenges that deeply affect development prospects and cannot be tackled by governments in isolation, as they affect rich and poor countries alike. They require regional and global solutions and solutions that take full account of development priorities and approaches. Their interrelated nature is strong justification for development officials to actively pursue PCD and work with their counterparts in other sectors to increase policy coherence. Even if both the EU and ACP share this broad agenda, within it they often have diverging interests and they are not yet used to working together on PCD.

Climate change

The Copenhagen negotiations ended on a disappointing note. The final Copenhagen Accord¹⁴ is non-binding, though, in an advance on the Bali conference, it does secure new and additional resources for a fast-start fund of \$10 billion/annum till 2012 and commitments to putting in place a \$100 billion/annum fund till 2020 as well as broad agreement to limit temperature increase below a 2°C target. However, many negotiators and commentators felt that the agreement lacked ambition and in particular failed to set emission reduction targets, timetables for disbursement of funds and verification procedures. What is more even the agreed 2°C temperature reduction was called into question, by a leaked UN report that suggested it would not be enough and by some small island states who sought a 1.5°C target.¹⁵


The Copenhagen negotiations confirmed that climate change is one of these global concerns that is shared by the EU and the ACP, but where their interests are very

different. The EU is among the bigger polluters, while ACP countries often feel that reducing emission will hold back their development. The EU tends to emphasise mitigation and cost sharing, while the ACP is generally more interested in adaptation for which it seeks EU funding. Despite agreeing a common ACP-EU position in November, at the end of the day maintaining a common front proved difficult.¹⁶

Different perspectives on how to tackle climate change clearly emerged in the talks but political considerations also weighed heavily on the negotiations. While China, for instance, tried to keep up face internationally by agreeing to some form of a deal they also had to satisfy local constituencies who view the climate change negotiations as an attempt to derail their development path.¹⁷ Equally President Obama, despite talking up the need for action, was ultimately hamstrung by political considerations back home.¹⁸

Copenhagen showed up again that the patterns of international relations and centres of influence are changing. For instance, it became apparent that the EU lacked clout and that emerging actors such as China have acquired enough weight to be able to influence international negotiations. Many observers noted that ultimately the deal was largely concluded between the USA and China, who also involved India, Brazil, South Africa, and that the EU was effectively sidelined.

Despite the fact that the EU had agreed on a common position in October 2009 and ministers insisted they worked closely together in Copenhagen, the Union continued to appear disunited. Leading up to the negotiations, different member states at times seemed to be going their own way, negotiating with different actors separately, or emphasising to the press the individual important contributions made by their own leaders. The apparent marginalisation of the EU towards the end of the conference does raise the question of how to increase the Union's impact on

2010	<p>BRIC summit in Brazil</p>	<p>January</p> <p>Malawian Presidency of the AU</p> <p>President of the Council takes office</p> <p>European Parliament vote on European Commission (26 Jan)</p> <p>14th AU Summit, Addis Ababa, (25 Jan – 2 Feb)</p> <p> Spanish EU Presidency</p>	<p>February</p> <p>Cotonou negotiations to end</p> <p>Conference on Development Finance and Emerging Donors, Moscow (17-18 Feb)</p> <p>Elections in Togo (28 Feb) Elections in Ivory Coast</p> <p>Elections in Côte d'Ivoire</p>	<p>March</p> <p>New ACP Secretary General Dr. Ibn Chambas takes office (1 March)</p> <p>Elections in the Central African Republic</p> <p>JAES Joint Taskforce</p> <p>Elections in Guinea (16 March)</p> <p>Elections in Madagascar</p>
2010				

future occasions. It was clearly too early to expect the Lisbon Treaty to already have had much effect in Copenhagen, but in the next round we must hope it provides the improved framework that helps the EU to really speak with one strong voice.

A lack of unity was also evident in the African house. Despite the existence of an African position agreed by AU member states on 24 August 2009, Ethiopia, which was representing the African continent, allegedly unilaterally agreed with France a 'joint appeal representing Africa' in Copenhagen which changed the demands initially agreed by African countries.¹⁹ South Africa also went its own way and used its alliances with India, China and Brazil.

The challenge to reach a legally binding agreement thus remains on the table as one of the major issues in international affairs for 2010. Negotiations will continue though the deadline to achieve this agreement by the end of the year has been removed from the Accord. Two major meetings are scheduled in June 2010 in Bonn and in November 2010 in Mexico. As the negotiations unfold a number of questions remain unanswered. Setting up legally binding financing targets and timetables, notably for the disbursements of the agreed funds and their management will be watched closely. To date, only 15% of such international funds have been disbursed and only a very small fraction has gone to developing countries.²⁰ Southern countries will also continue to call for an approach that goes beyond financing and for a greater focus on technology transfer and flexibilising intellectual property rights in order to help them to adapt even though this latter aspect was not included in the Copenhagen Accord. The EU needs to consider its position quickly and decide how best it can strengthen its own hand. Working as a more tightly unified block would seem essential, as would stronger alliances with other blocks of countries with which it has close ties such as the ACP and the AU.

MDGs: The last chance to get it right?

For the MDGs, 2010 will be dominated by preparations for the high-level UN meeting in September. This debate is also reaching a tipping point. In Jeffrey Sachs' words, the next UN MDG Summit is 'the last chance for the world to get it right'.²¹ According to the UN, only 30% of the commitments to achieve the MDG targets by 2015 were met by 2009,²² making their achievement within the agreed timeframe increasingly unlikely. As we enter 2010, attainment of certain MDGs such as that on reducing hunger is seriously undermined by the persisting global crisis as the UN warns of a new food crisis.²³

All countries are being encouraged to develop an action plan for achieving the MDG targets. The EU will hold informal meetings on ODA commitments and the MDGs in early 2010, and it plans to adopt a joint position for the MDG Summit on the issue of financing for development and ODA commitments. Special attention will be on the impact of the economic crisis and on commitments from Copenhagen, as well as finding innovative solutions for increasing development aid during times of economic downturn.²⁴ The Commission hopes that the JAES MDG Partnership, although it has otherwise made little progress, will play a significant role in triggering a joint EU-Africa position for the MDG Summit. It also wants to explore an enhanced MDG concept to tackle the chronic poverty that persists despite progress on the MDGs.²⁵ Greater emphasis on PCD is also vital as studies for the EU 2009 PCD Report show that the EU could do a lot to adapt its other policies such as the common trade policy in order to better support ACP efforts to attain the MDGs. In the run-up to the Summit, the UN will work closely with partners, such as the EU, to coordinate a 12-month series of global, regional and national initiatives to deepen understanding of what has and has not worked.²⁶

Achieving the MDGs will require further joint cooperation between the EU and the ACP. While there is need for closer cooperation at EU/EC level to mobilise for a change in current policies, the ACP States will also need to ensure effective governance and domestic resource mobilisation.

Migration – equal right to mobility?

Developed countries face ageing societies and decreasing populations, whereas developing nations struggle with growing populations, conflicts, the immediate effects of climate change and often, high unemployment rates. However, in contrast to popular belief in developed countries, the majority of migration actually takes place within developing countries' own borders²⁷. This is well reflected in the African Union's Kampala Convention on IDPs signed in October 2009. Moreover, out of all international migrants, only 30% actually move from a developing to a developed nation. An intra-ACP Migration Facility for 2009–13, financed by the Commission, aims to help ACP countries better understand and manage migration flows within their region.²⁸

Europe's approach to migration is often restrictive, though it has tried to counteract this through its Global Approach to migration policy²⁹. Developing countries face difficulties in keeping highly skilled people at home, especially in the areas of ICT and health. The EU's 'blue card' scheme³⁰ enabling highly skilled migrants to work within the EU to be implemented in 2010 has thus been criticized by ACP stakeholders. Developing countries have also suffered from a decrease in remittances due to the global crisis. Yet, as remittances still exceed ODA in many cases, the EU continues to seek ways to facilitate their transfer and to harness these flows more effectively for development.

In 2010, Europe will be seeking further collaborators for its mobility partnerships,

<p>April</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Elections in Sudan (5-12 April) 14th Africa-EU Ministerial Troika, Luxembourg, (27 April) EU High Representative to present proposals on EEAS European Commission assessment report on Monterrey commitments to be published European Commission 'spring package' of Communications on development to be published 	<p>May</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Mexico-EU Summit EU Foreign Affairs Council (FAC) with development focus EU LAC Summit, Madrid, (18 May) ACP-EU Ministerial Council Elections in the UK 6th EU-AU Human Rights Dialogue Elections in Ethiopia (23 May) 	<p>June</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> G8 summit in Muskoka, Canada (25-27 June) G20 in Canada Review Conference of the Rome Statute (31 May – 11 June) 2nd Summit of the Mediterranean Union, Barcelona (7 June) MTR CSP 10th EDF completed UN FCCC Meeting, Bonn 	<p>July</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> 15th AU Summit European Development Days, Brussels (possibly Sept) Elections in Burundi
2010			
			 Belgian EU Presidency

its major vehicle for linking migration and development, also aimed at promoting circular migration. But the EU will need to develop this concept further, as so far there has been little ACP interest in its current focus on readmission agreements, managing illegal migration and repackaging existing programmes. Another strong EU interest is engaging with diasporas and facilitating establishment of EU-wide diaspora frameworks, however this is at an early stage. According to the UN, developed countries should allow for more mobility, also for low skilled workers. The EU's blue card may be a first step, but this should be followed by further circular migration schemes for other social groups that can benefit development in ACP countries. The migration issue is a serious test for the credibility of EU external action. How far is Europe prepared to go in promoting a real debate on the complex issue of migration and development both within its borders and with its ACP partners?

III. EU development cooperation in 2010

The Lisbon Treaty

After some eight years of preparation, the Lisbon Treaty was finally ratified in 2009. The Treaty creates two major new posts. Thus, the European Council now has a President, Herman van Rompuy, appointed for two and a half years to ensure greater continuity. Also, the EU has a foreign policy chief, the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Catherine Ashton, who will head the EEAS and also be Vice-President of the Commission (box 1). She is expected to be the 'face' of Europe internationally and to strengthen coherence in external action. Further, the European Parliament and national parliaments now have a stronger role in scrutinising proposed EU legislation.

BOX 1. ROLE OF THE EUROPEAN EXTERNAL ACTION SERVICE (EEAS)

The EEAS will operate autonomously from the Commission and Council Secretariat and cooperate with member states' diplomatic services. Comprised of officials from the member states, the Commission and the Council Secretariat, it will support the High Representative in fulfilling her function, while simplifying the Union's external relations structures and bringing about closer cooperation between member states' diplomatic services and the Union. The Council has agreed on general guidelines for the EEAS, but its concrete organisation and functioning will be based on a proposal by the High Representative to be delivered by April 2010.

Development policy and the EEAS³⁴

Development policy will continue to be the responsibility of the Development Commissioner, but the EEAS is to have a leading role in strategic decision making, and there is to be close cooperation and consultation on the programming and implementation cycle between the EEAS and Commission:

- The EEAS will be involved in the whole programming chain for development, though the concrete division of labour between the EEAS and Commission for the different financial instruments has not been decided at the time of writing.
- The High Representative and Commissioner will prepare programming decisions jointly, but these will continue to be adopted by the College of Commissioners.
- Consultation procedures will be introduced between the EEAS and Commission services dealing with internal policies with a major external dimension.
- The EEAS will comprise the majority of geographical and thematic desks from both Council and Commission to cover all regions in the world including the ACP and will also include the EU delegations.
- The delegations will play a bigger role in programming and implementing external instruments. The High Representative will establish a roadmap for upgrading the EU delegations, to enable them to take over the role and function of the rotating presidency for local coordination and representation.

Despite the Treaty's long lead-time, the Union is less prepared for its implementation than might be expected, and many details still need resolution. For example, the mandates of the top jobs are vague. Van Rompuy and Ashton will thus be setting precedents for how their posts are seen in the future. Will large member states really allow them to represent Europe? How will they relate to the rotating presidency and the Commission President? How will turf wars³¹ be avoided between the Commission, the EEAS and the rotating presidency?

What role for development policy?

The fundamental challenge that the Lisbon Treaty poses for development cooperation is whether or not it will be effectively used to increase policy coherence in EU external action. The Lisbon Treaty has introduced a requirement that other policy areas of the Union must take into account its international development objectives. Promoting development internationally becomes one of the Union's objectives (Art.21). Consistency of EU external action is also an aim and a number of measures, such as the 'double-hatted' High Representative, should also promote policy coherence in practice. In addition, the Treaty has further increased the European




Table 1. Nominees for the European Commission, 2010–14

COMMISSIONER	COUNTRY	PORTFOLIO
External relations family		
Catherine Ashton*	UK	High Representative for Foreign Affairs & Security Policy & 1st Vice-President
Andris Piebalgs*	Latvia	Development
Karel de Gucht*	Belgium	Trade
Stefan Füle	Czech Republic	Enlargement & Neighbourhood Policy
Rumiana Jeleva	Bulgaria	International Cooperation, Humanitarian Aid & Crisis Response
Portfolios of relevance to development		
Connie Hedegaard	Denmark	Climate Action
Olli Rehn*	Finland	Economic and Monetary Affairs
Günther Oettinger	Germany	Energy
Maria Damanaki	Greece	Maritime Affairs and Fisheries
Dacian Ciolos	Romania	Agriculture and Rural Development
Cecilia Malmström	Sweden	Home Affairs (incl. migration & asylum)

*Also served in the Barroso I Commission

Parliament’s scope to either positively or negatively influence the promotion of PCD. The question is therefore whether these Treaty innovations that favour policy coherence will actually result in increased coherence for development.

The Treaty of Lisbon restates reduction and eradication of poverty as the primary objective of the Union’s development cooperation. Development policy is and remains separate from the Common Foreign and Security Policy, while the member states and the Union will continue to share competence for development. The Foreign Affairs Council (FAC), chaired by the High Representative, will be responsible for development cooperation and ensuring consistency of EU external action.³² The Development Commissioner will represent the Commission in the FAC,³³ allowing him

to federate between the various EU policies that are to become more coherent towards the aforementioned Union’s development objective.

The High Representative will be supported by a new EU diplomatic service, the EEAS that will have a major impact on how development policy is conducted.


For many observers, the new arrangements hold two major dangers for development: (i) the possible *instrumentalisation* of development for shorter-term foreign policy goals and (ii) its potential *sidelining*. As the EEAS will have desks for all countries it will resolve the longstanding inconsistency of the Directorate General for Development (DG DEV) being responsible for development policy and ACP countries on the one side and the Directorate

General for External Relations (DG RELEX) responsible for all remaining developing countries on the other. This could, however, weaken the position of the ACP Group.

Many of the uncertainties will be addressed in 2010. But it is already clear that the Treaty is about maximising EU policy coherence. It remains to be seen how prominent development will be in the new set-up, and whether the Union’s external relations structures will indeed be simplified and development will have more leverage over other areas than before so as to ensure real *development effectiveness* rather than just aid effectiveness.

Faces in the new Commission

The confirmation of the Barroso II Commission was delayed to January 2010 in order to ensure that it could be appointed under the new Lisbon Treaty rules. The EP vote on the new Commission is expected on 26 January. Table 1 lists Commissioners within the external relations family, as well as a number of colleagues with whom the Development Commissioner will have to cooperate closely if he wants to promote greater policy coherence for development in EU external action. The new Development Commissioner was in charge of the energy portfolio in the Barroso I Commission and has had some exposure to relations with Africa through the energy partnership of the JAES. His cooperation with the Climate Action Commissioner, who, as out-going Danish Minister for Climate, chaired the Copenhagen Summit, will be of key importance in discussions on the use of ODA funds. Some responsibilities have been divided up differently from Barroso I to II. Two different Commissioners are now responsible for development and humanitarian aid. In addition, responsibility for Enlargement and for the European Neighbourhood Policy have been combined, making the EU’s ability to respond to the AU ‘one-Africa’ goal even more difficult to achieve. This will also divide EuropeAid, as the implementation of ENP programmes



will be managed by DG ELARG. EuropeAid will probably be split further as some of the programming of development are likely to go to the EEAS. At this point in time, it is difficult to see how such a highly fragmented institutional arrangement will be able to generate a coherent response to the major external action challenges.

Budget review

The incoming Commission faces the task of preparing the 'financial perspectives' for the next EU budget period, 2014–21. This has to be presented in early 2011, so 2010 will be devoted to building consensus around budget priorities. A draft Commission communication³⁵ has suggested a significant increase in the budget for EU external action and makes 'global Europe' one of five EU priorities. It also proposes more strategic partnerships based on common interests, such as energy and migration. Assistance to Africa would remain a priority, but delivery would have to improve. There is a further suggestion that greater use be made of loans in addition to grants, and once again the proposal to integrate the EDF into the Budget so as to improve effectiveness. Geographic approaches would remain at the centre of EU external spending policies. While the 'financial perspectives' and the way the next EU Budget is constructed is important, the key issue is thus the often intensely political debate among the member states and with the Commission on the policy orientations and priorities that lie behind the Budget. Out of this will emerge the programme of the Union for the same period.

Presidency agendas

The next three rotating presidencies of the EU will be assumed by Spain, Belgium (2010) and Hungary (2011). Their draft 18-month programme highlights the following issues for development:

- Compliance with ODA commitments
- Promoting aid effectiveness
- Monitoring and acting upon achievement of the MDGs
- Concluding the CPA revision
- Concluding/follow-up EPAs/encourage AFT
- Strengthen cooperation with emerging donors

Overall this represents a fairly 'business as usual' agenda, although the interest in emerging donors is relatively new as a specific priority. At the same time both Spain and Belgium have their own geographical interests that will play a role.

For Spain, West Africa is likely to figure prominently on the agenda whereas for Belgium the African Great Lakes region is likely to be a key focus. Other conflict areas in Africa, notably the Horn, will also continue to be a concern. PCD does not feature as such in the development section of the programme, but in other sections there are references to peace and security, migration, climate change and trade policy, though only in the case of migration is the link with development policy referred to explicitly.

Tools for the implementation of the new international cooperation agenda

As things stand at the start of the year, no major changes in EU development policy feature in the calendar for 2010, however the new Development Commissioner may well wish to spell out a new agenda. A number of existing policy tools which offer scope for the implementation of the new international cooperation agenda do exist however and some may evolve during the year.

European Consensus on Development

In 2010, the *European Consensus on Development* will be five years old.³⁶ Signed by all three principal EU institutions (Council, Commission and Parliament) the Consensus sets out a common vision to guide both member states and the EU in development cooperation. It has provided a solid basis for enhancing joint EU action on a number of fronts and, according to a 2007 Eurobarometer poll, is in fact more widely known among the European public than the MDGs themselves. A recent study concluded that it is too early to revise the *Consensus* and the focus in 2010 should be on its further implementation³⁷, but further progress in its use will depend on the endorsement and political support it receives from its three sponsors, each of which has now seen changes in political leadership. In particular it will be politically important that the Consensus is seen as commanding strong support in the run up to the financial perspectives debate as it provides the policy base for the EU Budget's DCI.

EU division of labour

The 2005 Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness called for a "more effective division of labour" to counteract the fragmentation of aid, increase complementarity and improve alignment. Division of labour (DoL) refers to "streamlining and coordinating donors' assistance, for example by reducing the


number of active donors in each sector, area or topic or the number of sectors, areas or topics focused on by any one donor in a given partner country."³⁸ Progress on EU division of labour has been disappointing. A recent paper by the Commission and the Swedish Presidency³⁹ lists a variety of reasons for this, including lack of political will and coordination from EU capitals, partner country obstacles, delegations lacking authority to take decisions on sector concentration, lack of reliable information on donor presence, differing planning cycles, initial high transaction costs, and lack of understanding of lead, active and silent donors. The paper also proposes an operationalisation framework, later endorsed by the Council.⁴⁰ This calls on member states to continue the agreed 'fast-track initiative', developing a joint action plan and timeframe per country by 31 March 2010. It appeals to member states to pursue sector concentration by identifying a number of countries where the EU will do joint programming by 2014. The slow progress threatens the credibility of the initiative, but if the EU is indeed serious about pursuing DoL, the moment of truth will be the Third High-Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness in Seoul in 2011. Significant progress will need to be made in 2010 for there to be something to show by then. At the same time a recent report⁴¹ estimates that member states could save €3-6 billion by working better together. The financial crisis might thus just provide the push needed to take this agenda forward.

Policy coherence for development

In September 2009, the EU published its second biannual report⁴² on PCD and a Communication⁴³, which proposed a 'whole of Union approach' to EU policy. The Communication recognised that due to closer interactions and ever intensifying globalisation the side effects of other EU policies on developing countries have become increasingly prominent. This growing trend gradually reduces the relative influence of ODA on promoting development and reorients ACP-EU cooperation and policy dialogue towards a wider focus on international cooperation. In 2009, this re-orientation of development cooperation was, for instance, illustrated by debates on using ODA to reduce climate change, or to support refugee camps in developing countries so as to further EU migration policies, but equally the other way around: using leftover funds from the Common Agricultural Policy to support food security in developing countries.

The Council agreed in November to a Commission proposal to prioritise five areas

Figure 1. Survey respondents' views on the relevance of the ACP Group beyond 2020



for a more pro-active and result-oriented effort to promote EU PCD, namely (a) trade and finance, (b) climate change, (c) global food security, (d) migration and (e) security⁴⁴. At the same time the previously agreed 12 priority sectors for PCD were not dropped. The Council also called on the Commission and the Member States to develop a results-based PCD work programme in 2010 that further operationalises the five areas and defines how to take forward the dialogue on PCD with developing countries. Improving result-orientation may appear as largely a technical issue but it is essentially about clarifying and making explicit the ambition for change. With this agenda and the new institutional arrangements of the Lisbon Treaty, 2010 is a good moment to take the

PCD agenda forward. The EU however still needs to convince many doubters that it is seriously committed to PCD. If more focus leads to greater progress that is clearly positive, but homing in on 5 issues within the 12 priority sectors could equally just turn out to be a lowering of ambitions.

IV. ACP-EU relations: Prospects for 2010

One of the key trends in EU external action over the past has been the progressive 'regionalisation' of the Unions relations and a move towards region to region


partnerships. The oldest of these is of course the ACP-EU partnership, but others such as with ASEM or the Mercosur have arisen since. The EU's relationship with the ACP is changing however, as the EPA negotiations favour smaller regional groupings and the rise of the African Union has meant the broader ACP Group has to find more space for a more assertive African group amongst its members. As the new leadership in the Commission and EU Council Secretariat take over the reins it will be important to watch what new slant they give to this established trend.

ACP

What progress with the ACP?

The ACP-EU Cotonou Partnership Agreement will see the conclusion of its second revision in February 2010. The negotiations should be completed just before the newly elected Ghanaian ACP Secretary General, Mohamed Ibn Chambas, currently President of the ECOWAS Commission, assumes his position in March. Among other challenges he will face a rising debate about the future of the ACP Group. Cotonou and the Group itself have come under increasing pressure arising from the tensions around the still unfinished EPA negotiations. More recently, the apparent lack of consistency between the CPA and the Joint Africa-Europe Strategy have not helped. Now halfway through the 20-year lifespan of the Cotonou Agreement, the relevance of the ACP Group as a prime partner for the EU is increasingly questioned. A recent ECDPM survey found that 52% of respondents do not perceive a clear relevance of the ACP Group beyond 2020. European respondents are most negative (61%), while a small majority of ACP respondents are positive about the Group's future. Among the ACP, Africans appear slightly less positive than their Caribbean and Pacific counterparts (figure 1).

Figure 2. What should be the top priorities for EU development cooperation in 2010?



Coping with the impact of the Lisbon Treaty is another challenge facing the new ACP Secretariat. The Treaty will change the way the EU deals with the ACP as a group and with development issues, especially due to the division of geographical desks between DG DEV and the newly created EEAS.⁴⁵ As indicated above the Group has expressed concerns over the institutional changes noting that the new Treaty no longer contains a specific reference to the ACP.

The ECDPM poll on EU-ACP relations shows interesting differences on ACP and EU views on priority areas for cooperation. Poverty reduction and education remain the clear top two priorities (figure 2) for both groups.

Figure 3. ACP views on priority areas of EU cooperation in their country or region in 2010





Figure 4. African perceptions of the most influential international actors in their country/region



There is also broad agreement on food security and climate change, with Europeans ranking these as third and fourth. However, ACP respondents rank industrialisation and infrastructure ahead of these, in third place, whereas this priority is very low on the Europeans' list. ACP respondents also attach more importance to tackling corruption than do Europeans. On the other hand, Europeans are more concerned about security and conflict resolution, which ACP respondents ranked low as an area for European engagement. When asked (in a separate question) about cooperation priorities in their own region, ACP respondents

provided a slightly different ranking than in figure 2, with tackling corruption being the first priority area where they see a role for the EU. Figure 3 shows that the role of EU as a global player is perceived differently when it comes to its role at a national level. Furthermore, the difference in prioritisation between ACP and EU respondents uncovers structural difference of views in the way stakeholders from the two regions approach development and tend to confirm other indications from ACP officials that European donors are generally not good at fully aligning their development assistance to ACP priorities.

Economic Partnership Agreements

Nine African and one Pacific country signed an interim national EPA with the EU in 2009.⁴⁶ As these agreements vary, ACP countries now export to EU markets under differing trade regimes,⁴⁷ adding to the complexity of ACP regional integration processes, especially in Africa. The national interim agreements also leave outstanding contentious issues for the negotiations at the regional level, so in many cases, no understanding has yet been reached on even the thematic scope and extent of commitments under full EPAs. With some exceptions, African countries continue to show little ambition to make significant commitments on trade in services, investment and related issues.

The major challenges for ACP-EU trade relations in 2010 are, therefore, first to conclude full development-oriented EPAs, which maintain regional coherence and second to implement the agreements. EPA implementation will require policy and institutional reforms at the national level, as well as appropriate institutional frameworks at the regional level and continental levels to coordinate and oversee national EPA implementation units and to monitor impacts. Pragmatic needs assessments will also be required, to identify accompanying measures that enable ACP signatories to take full advantage of the EPAs; and EU donors will need to define a coordinated approach.

Aid for trade

For the EU AfT strategy, 2010 will be a year of the EU delivering on its AfT commitments. The EU will annually provide €2 billion of trade-related assistance, some €1 billion of which will be in EU aid and €1 billion in bilateral aid from member states.⁴⁸ Several member states have also made individual pledges for trade-related assistance and AfT.⁴⁹ However, whether AfT brings additional resources for trade support or is more a reclassification of existing aid remains to be seen.⁵⁰

The EU expects to come up with regional AfT packages for a coordinated response to the regional integration agendas of ACP countries.⁵¹ Since little progress was made on these in 2009, it is still uncertain what these packages will contain and the role they will play. Nonetheless, efforts for joint (EU and non-EU) programming and delivery of AfT need to be strengthened in 2010, in line with the EU AfT strategy and the EU Code of Conduct on Complementarity and Division of Labour (May 2007). Though coordinated initiatives have risen in number in recent years, they are still far from common practice.⁵² Other challenges that need to

BOX 2. WHO DOES AFRICA VIEW AS ITS KEY PARTNERS?

A number of emerging powers have accelerated their engagement with Africa. The global financial crisis in 2008 provided additional impetus for this trend, especially for China, which notwithstanding the global slowdown, has continued to scale up its engagement on the continent. This has consolidated its position as a partner among African states.

Asia's phenomenal growth in the last two decades – and more recently Brazil's – has also brought new opportunities for African states. Africa's traditional partners have sometimes viewed this as a threat to their own influence there, couching their concerns in altruistic terms that new partners may contribute (in)advertently to a regression of democratic freedoms and good governance. It is true that some new actors play by rules different from those of European partners. Yet, this is not necessarily negative; nor are rules of engagement static by any means. Furthermore, though a truism, Africa is neither a single entity nor monolithic in its approach to international relations.

But who are these new actors and partners? They fall into two broad categories: the large (re)emerging powers, with China first among them, followed by India, Brazil and Russia; and smaller countries, such as Malaysia, South Korea and Venezuela. Their interests vary from purely commercial to political and do not always exclude the developmental and altruistic. They may compete with traditional powers for commercial advantage and political influence, but they may also collaborate in peace and security or development.

There is a third group, drawn from Africa itself. These are African regional powers, such as Libya, Nigeria, South Africa and Angola. They too are driven by various

interests, operate under diverse codes of conduct, and have varying drivers and impacts on African economic development and peace and security.

African recipient states value different aspects of these partnerships. For some, partners help elites to retain power and wealth. For others, partners collaborate in national developmental projects where ownership resides locally; for still others, partners provide greater leverage and room for manoeuvre to pursue certain agendas nationally, regionally and globally.

The proliferation of new actors with an interest in Africa has broadened the choices available. As multipolarity deepens – a development which the financial crisis helped to accelerate – the European Union will find itself increasingly competing with these new actors for space in areas that have been traditionally its field of operations, as well as in regions where EU interest has been reignited by new actors' activities. How the EU responds will be crucial to the way its partnership with the African continent is perceived.

For Africa, Europe continues to be an important source of trade, investment and development assistance. However, many Africans regard European responses to new actors as reflecting insecurity about future EU engagement on the continent. The Joint EU-Africa Strategy and the attempt to create more coordination among the EU, China and Africa on certain issues is seen in the same light. Some ask why the Europeans never suggested such coordination with the Japanese or the Americans in Africa?

There are also crucial areas in which the EU is found to be lacking in sincerity, which makes exploring options with

others appealing to African states. Most notably, the manner in which negotiations for the Economic Partnership Agreements were conducted has left a bitter taste, as has the European engagement around trade issues in the multilateral Doha round.

The end of the commodity boom, however, has created new challenges for African states. Attracting investment is becoming more difficult, export earnings are down, and supply capacity continues to hamper sustainable economic development. More effective states, more diversified economies and improved governance are necessary now more than ever. Partnerships on these fronts will continue to be important, and European state and non-state actors are well-placed to support such initiatives.

What is undeniable, though, is that these new global circumstances require the adoption of new mindsets. New types of partnerships need to be fostered that engage with Africa, not only through the prism of aid (thus in an unequal relationship of donor versus recipient), but also recognise that African states are not babes-in-the-wood. African states see the opportunities presented by the interest of new actors as a vehicle for diversifying relations, exerting leverage where it exists and taking advantage of developmental projects where these are on offer. Unfortunately, in less democratic and accountable states, such politics may not always have the interest of the electorate at heart. But the question we should be asking is whether the problem lies with the 'tempter', as seen by some, or the one tempted.

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be addressed in 2010 and beyond are (i) further alignment of trade and AfT concerns with national and regional development strategies, (ii) strengthening capacities to effectively deliver (EU) and absorb (ACP) AfT at the regional and national level, and (iii) ensuring effective results-oriented monitoring and evaluation.⁵³

AfT from the EU is not conditional upon signing an EPA.⁵⁴ Nevertheless, ACP representatives are expected to continue insisting on sufficient and

effective accompanying measures for EPA implementation in the run-up to the conclusion of the negotiations. The current global crisis has however dampened EU enthusiasm for committing to additional financial burdens on top of their current pledges.

Africa

Africa's international relations

Despite Europe's periodic soul searching

about the growing influence of China in Africa and the practical problems associated with implementation of the JAES, Africans continue to perceive the EU as the most influential external actor on the continent, followed at some distance by the US and then China (figure 4). Africa is understandably seeking to exploit the increasing opportunities available to it and diversify its international partnerships (box 2). At the same time, as Africa's choices increase, so do the prospects

for a more balanced partnership with Europe providing the latter is prepared to recognise the changes and adapt its behaviour accordingly.

Progress with the JAES

A number of fault lines regarding the implementation of the Strategy's action plan surfaced in 2009 and so far very few of the Partnerships have achieved results. Besides practical issues to do with the institutional arrangements – for instance the role of the inclusive but rather cumbersome Joint Expert Groups (JEGs) – more political issues also emerged. A continuing lack of member states buy-in seemed to be the major issue but there was also growing questioning of the real traction of the Strategy and about who should provide the leadership. The added value of the JAES (i.e. establishing a new political partnership between two continents) seems to have been diluted as a result of undue concentration on a more technical approach to implementing the JAES. The lack of continuing alignment of EU funding instruments to the JAES was an on-going irritant for the African side who saw it as indicating a disinterest in the 'treat Africa as one' principle and as adding unnecessary complexity to the financing of implementation.

Thus, 2010 will be a crucial year for keeping the very idea of the JAES alive, as a potentially innovative instrument for a modern partnership between Europe and Africa. Bold action will be required by both parties to reassert the essentially political nature of the JAES in preparation for the Third Africa-EU Summit scheduled for late 2010 in Libya. Both sides have agreed to present options for improving JAES implementation, in view of the second action plan to be endorsed at the Summit. For this, ideas will need to be presented at the next ministerial troika in April 2010. In preparation for this the partners hope to address fundamental issues such as added value, content, structure and institutional issues that have plagued the implementation of the current action plan. However, progress with the JAES will require a genuine joint-problem solving process.

The African Union Authority

In February 2009, African Heads of States decided to transform the current AU Commission into a stronger 'AU Authority'. The new Authority would have 11 areas of jurisdiction, namely continent-wide poverty reduction, inter-regional and continental infrastructure, climate, epidemics and pandemics, research/university centres of excellence, food security, free movement of people, foreign and defence policy, international trade and negotiations, transnational crime, and peace and security.⁵⁵

BOX 3. THE SITUATION IN SOMALIA AND SUDAN

Sudan

Sudan's six-year transitional period, created by the Comprehensive Peace Agreement of 2005, is yet to face the two most momentous and dangerous events in Sudan's transformation: (i) national elections in April 2010 and (ii) preparations for a referendum in January 2011 and post-referendum arrangements. Mismanagement of these processes would signal an end to the negotiated peace and years of national transformation, however slow and superficial, and ultimately a return to war.

Elections are politically dangerous events, given the need to adopt certain positions and push particular agendas to form alliances, and in the setting of a highly polarised nation like Sudan the process will prove quite difficult to manage. Though several laws have been passed and an electoral commission established, an array of obstacles remain, in particular, reaching consensus on the disputed national census of 2008 so that electoral geographic constituencies may be established, rebutting unconstitutional powers of the security apparatus, eliminating restrictions to the press, stabilising Darfur so that the population may participate in the electoral process, and initiating comprehensive voter registration and civic education to explain the complex poll. The Sudanese will be electing Sudan's President, the President of the Government of South Sudan (GOSS), members of the national assembly, members of the legislative assembly of South Sudan, state governors and state assemblies. The greatest challenge will be managing security in a volatile political environment and guaranteeing legitimacy of the electoral process so that it is deemed free, fair and transparent by all parties. An additional uncertainty remains what will happen if the representation of the South is reduced in the national parliament. This might impact key legislation like the referendum law and the negotiation of post-referendum arrangements.

Other challenges in the run-up to the January 2011 referendum relate to wealth-sharing and the implementation of the Permanent Court of Arbitration ruling on the

oil-rich region of Abyei, the North-South border demarcation, and the popular consultation processes for the transitional areas. Solving the Darfur conflict in a coordinated manner (as opposed to all the different initiatives – from Egypt, Qatar, Libya, Russia) is another challenge, as is addressing the surge in inter-communal violence in South Sudan. How Khartoum and the international community deals with the arrest warrants and outstanding indictments of the International Criminal Court in Sudan will provide another important marker.

Somalia

Somalia remains Africa's most intractable conflict, without any clearly established path towards stabilisation, reconciliation and state-building. The Djibouti Peace Process is currently facing a possibility of collapse even though the government of Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed is still operational. One of the greatest challenges will be to find a strategy to infuse a new sense of legitimacy into a moribund political process, to bring on board several elements of the opposition, to tackle the Islamist insurgency (militarily, at the grassroots level, through negotiation, and exploiting fragmentation between Hizbul Islam and Al-Shabaab), and to restore law and order in the South/Central regions. In order for these challenges to be met, a comprehensive security sector reform needs to occur, the judicial system needs to be strengthened, the consensual implementation of Sharia law is needed, the humanitarian crisis needs to be addressed, and a new formula for peace and stability has to be considered. The new Transitional Unity Government remains the best hope for a political process, but it is facing several hurdles and so far has a record of failure in the reconciliation process and in forging a common national vision. Any process of nation-building in Somalia will pose a difficult exercise for the Somalis and the international community leading to the idea that a more creative, decentralised and inclusive building-block approach to peace is necessary.

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The transformation process is expected to extend well beyond 2010. The AU Commission is a formal organ of the AU, and replacing it requires an amendment of the AU Constitutive Act, which, although adopted by the Assembly by consensus, or a two-thirds majority, then needs to be submitted for ratification by all member states.⁵⁶

In preparation for such an amendment, the Assembly requested the Commission to prepare the various legal steps that might be required to adapt other AU rules of procedure and statutes. It also tasked the AU Commission and the Permanent Representatives Committee (PRC) to reflect on the structure the new AU Authority would need to carry out its proposed mandate and the financial implications of the change. This process will take place in 2010, with a preliminary report submitted in July to the AU Assembly of Heads of States. Even if the legal instruments are ready by then, the ratification process will take time given the current divisions within Africa regarding creation of the Authority.

Governance agenda in Africa

This is another major test awaiting the partnership between Europe and Africa. A serious democratic backlash has become evident in many African countries, with a growing number of incumbent leaders seeking to retain power through flawed elections and constitutional manipulations. The AU is assuming growing responsibilities in dealing with governance matters. For instance, with the support of ECOWAS, it suspended two of its members in 2009, Niger and Guinea. Both were disciplined for disrespect of constitutional order, with sanctions imposed in the form of movement restrictions and an arms embargo. Negotiations for their readmission will continue into 2010.

At the same time, although consultation has increased, political dialogue on governance issues between Europe and Africa remains disappointingly weak. Closer collaboration needs to be developed, but each side also needs to play its own part. Thus for instance, the African continent has to further consolidate its governance institutions and the EU has to become more coherent in dealing with undemocratic change. The AUC has already started leading continental consultations on the construction of an African Governance Architecture (AGA) with the view to strengthening the linkages and complementarity between the different governance institutions from local to continental levels. A series of multi-stakeholders meetings have been organised across the continent over the past year and

it is hoped this will help create an African governance platform by the end of 2010. For its part, Europe still seems divided on the approach to follow on governance-related matters. It asserts itself as the key promoter of democracy and human rights while it lacks a coherent approach in dealing with democracy breaches.

The International Criminal Court

Since the indictment of Sudanese President Omar al Bashir in July 2008 by the ICC, the issues of universal jurisdiction and the role of the ICC in African conflicts have gained prominence. During the 13th ordinary session of the AU Summit held in July 2009, the African Union called on its members not to cooperate with the ICC due to the failure of the Security Council to consider deferral in the case against Bashir.

However, African countries signatory to the Rome Statute have, on several occasions, indicated that they would feel under obligation to arrest the Sudanese President should he enter their territory.⁵⁷ The first half of 2010 will therefore be clouded by debate within Africa on the subject, as the continent prepares for the upcoming revision of the Rome Statute on 31 May in Kampala.

Africa's armed conflict zones

Two African armed conflicts will continue to dominate discussions between the EU and the continent. These are Sudan and Somalia (box 3).

Sudan did not ratify the Cotonou Agreement due to the clause on the ICC and the passages on fighting HIV/AIDS through safe sex practices and use of contraceptives.⁵⁸ Non-ratification affects financial disbursements from the 10th EDF, raising concern about the possible impact of the situation on the peace process. During the Third Sudan Consortium⁵⁹ in May 2008, the EC pledged support worth €300 million from EDF funds⁶⁰ for implementation of the North-South Comprehensive Peace Agreement, but these funds will now no longer be available to Sudan. The suspension of disbursements under EDF 10 will not affect EU support to humanitarian activities, which are not governed by the Cotonou Agreement.

For Somalia, the current mandate of the EU maritime security operation ATALANTA ends in December 2010. The EU has made a political commitment to step up its engagement in promoting peace and development in this country⁶¹, but so far this has materialised mainly through funding to the AMISOM. However, this funding was suspended in October 2009 due to

delays in AU accounting for past funds, leaving the AU force without operational funding.⁶² In November 2009, at the request of the transitional government in Mogadishu, the EU agreed to train up to 2,000 Somali soldiers in Uganda.⁶³ So in 2010, to fulfil its pledge the EU will need to step up its efforts, in coordination with its international partners, to develop a serious political strategy for Somalia, in addition to supporting and training security forces which are unlikely to be able to end this conflict on their own.

Article 96 cases

There are a number of on-going Article 96 consultations (under the Cotonou Agreement) that will go on into 2010. The EU announced sanctions against Guinea on 27 October 2009, including an arms embargo and a visa ban restricting travel into Europe by members of the Guinean military junta, in response to a massacre of Guinean demonstrators on 28 September 2009. The Article 96 consultations were opened earlier following the coup d'état in December 2008, with the EU calling for the reestablishment of constitutional order. Until this happens, the Commission cannot disburse the €237 million committed under the Country Strategy Paper and National Indicative Programme for Guinea. The mid-term review of the 10th EDF, the conclusions of which are scheduled for 2010, will analyse implementation performance and might agree to reassess Guinea's allocation.⁶⁴

With Niger, Article 96 consultations were launched on 7 October 2009, following President Tanja's decision to bypass a constitutional court decision and dissolve parliament to organise new parliamentary elections that would allow him to amend the constitution. While consultations are ongoing, cooperation activities under the EDF 10 national indicative programme will be confined to 'payments relating to contracts already being implemented, humanitarian measures or those that directly benefit the population and preparatory measures for the implementation of future projects'.⁶⁵ Similarly, Article 96 consultations with Madagascar began in July 2009, following the country's controversial political transition in March.⁶⁶ Consultations will continue until the elections, now scheduled for the end of 2010, are held. Political dialogue between the EU and Zimbabwe is also once again stalled. In November 2009, the EU issued a critical communiqué following the arrest of prominent members of the Zimbabwean Congress of Trade Unions.⁶⁷

The Caribbean

The LAC summit, which will take place in Madrid in May 2010, has already led to some traditional demands regarding EU-Caribbean relations resurfacing. Although Spain has indicated that it attaches importance to full Caribbean involvement in the meeting, questions remain about how their interests will be dealt with. Caribbean states feel that a coordinating mechanism should be put in place to ensure that their concerns are considered by the larger states at the EU-LAC meeting.⁶⁸

The Commission has suggested developing a Caribbean-EU joint strategy in the run-up to the EU-LAC and EU-CARIFORUM summits. Yet a major concern in the Caribbean is the implementation and monitoring of EPAs⁶⁹, which the EU has not addressed sufficiently. As the Caribbean is diversifying its international relations and is creating stronger links with Latin America, its traditional relationship with the EU is changing. Thus before a joint strategy is drafted, sufficient time should be invested in scrutinising future EU/Caribbean common interests, the added value of future cooperation for both partners, and the role of the Caribbean in the ACP group.

The dialogue between the EU and Cuba has been welcomed by the Caribbean. In its communication on the LAC Summit, the EC noted, 'After years of stagnation in the relations, high level political dialogue has been launched and development cooperation re-established with Cuba which could eventually create the conditions for a contractual framework for EU-Cuba relations'.⁷⁰

The Pacific

Trade negotiations will dominate the Pacific regional agenda in 2010. While some Pacific island countries recently renewed their interest in becoming party to an EPA, attention in the region will increasingly turn to new negotiations with Australia and New Zealand on a 'PACER-plus' trade agreement (PACER is the *Pacific Agreement on Closer Economic Relations*). The recent appointment of a chief trade advisor for the Pacific Islands will establish a new negotiating machinery to replace the Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat, but the new body will need to be set up before the difficult task of helping the islands forge initial regional positions, especially on the scope of agreements, can begin.

Governance is another focus in the region, particularly with respect to continued political pressure on Fiji's interim government to hold democratic elections, which have now been postponed until 2012. Following on several years of a successful stabilisation mission in the Solomons and then capacity-building activities, there may be scope in 2010 to seek a clear long-term resolution for the Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands (RAMSI).

In terms of Pacific-EU cooperation, the main challenge will be to maintain the relationship and high profile of previous years, for example, by making progress on an EU-Pacific strategy.

V. Engaging effectively with the international agenda

As the EU shifts to its new institutional arrangements for external action with the Lisbon Treaty it will be vital that it quickly learns to use these to best effect in the evolving global agenda. The new Development Commissioner can choose to interpret his brief in a traditional manner as a narrowly defined development focus, or he can work closely with the new High Representative and their other external relations colleagues to ensure that development priorities and experience are well integrated into the EU's response to global concerns such as trade, security, governance, migration, agriculture, food security, climate change, energy and global finance. It remains to be seen whether the EU/EC is ready for a much more ambitious, politically negotiated and coherent approach to its external action (beyond aid) in line with the systemic challenges now confronting the international community. There is clearly a potential risk of instrumentalisation, with ODA money coming under pressure from non-development agendas, but it is also increasingly evident that unless these challenges are met with an integrated response, high levels of policy coherence and the EU member states acting closely together there is little chance that they can be overcome. The Lisbon Treaty means that, technically at least, the EU is better equipped to take this path but leadership and vision are also essential as is commitment and not just from the new leadership in the EU institutions but also from member state governments. In emerging policy sectors, such as climate change, migration, natural resource management, it will be necessary

to develop a bold vision on global interdependencies, mutual interests, innovative forms of political dialogue and cooperation as well as mechanisms that can 'development-proof' non-development policies. Development impact must continue to be the single criterion guiding the use of ODA, but development actors must also engage with their counterparts in other policy sectors so as to develop joint approaches. All actors also need to take far more seriously the need to increase both the quantity and quality of financing required to secure development, climate change adaptation and mitigation and tackle the other global challenges the ACP and EU currently face.

The current global crisis creates a real opportunity for debate on the development dimension of an array of international concerns and thus for a wider discussion on how development money should be spent alongside the resources allocated for climate change or other concerns. Both the EU and developing countries have a stake in making such an integrated approach work even though their specific interests are often different. Region to region relationships are ideal frameworks for such debates that go beyond national interests. But regional dialogues also need institutions such as the AU, the ACP or the EU itself and it is important therefore to ensure that adequate care and energy goes into their development, resourcing and governance. It is thus vital that the AU and the EU maintain close working relations and if their current framework of dialogue and joint action, the Joint Africa-EU Strategy, is not operating optimally at present, it is crucial this is resolved and agreement quickly reached on how to make it work better. Equally, the EU's long standing relationship with the ACP has at least another 10 years of life ahead and all parties concerned must work closely together to make better use of the opportunities it offers and ensure its continued relevance and value. 2010, with a newly revised Cotonou Agreement and new political leadership in both the ACP and the EU, is the moment to make sure this happens.

Bold political leadership, strengthened leverage for development, policy coherence for development as well as a strong commitment to serious political dialogue with the ACP and to reforming global governance systems should therefore all be essential features of the EU's agenda for external action in 2010.

NOTES

- 1 SAIIA, www.saiia.org.za and the ISS, www.iss.org.za
- 2 333 anonymous respondents answered the ECDPM survey: 129 Europeans, 185 ACP and 19 from other regions. 42% of the respondents were from government, 35% from NGOs and Think Tanks, 12% from the private sector and 11% from other organizations or private individuals. The survey was conducted between mid-September and mid-November 2009.
- 3 ACP Communiqué, Bananas: will the European Union confirm that the fight against poverty is no longer a priority in its 'global Europe' strategy? www.acp.int/en/trade/acpstatementbanana09.html
- 4 UN Special Rapporteur: 'Trade Negotiations need to reflect the new global consensus on hunger', 1 Dec 2009, Geneva. www.srfood.org/images/stories/pdf/otherdocuments/20091201_press-release_ministerial-wto_en.pdf
- 5 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development. 2009. Trade and Development Report 2009. www.unctad.org/en/docs/tr2009overview_en.pdf
- 6 World Trade Organization DG Pascal Lamy's speech to the WTO public forum, 28 September 2009. www.wto.org/english/news_e/sppl_e/sppl136_e.htm
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List of acronyms

ACP	Africa, Caribbean and Pacific	FAC	Foreign Affairs Council
AfDB	African Development Bank	FDI	Foreign Direct Investment
AfT	Aid for Trade	GAERC	General Affairs and External Relations Council
AMISOM	African Mission in Somalia	GNI	Gross National Income
ASEM	Asia-Europe Meetings	ICC	International Criminal Court
AUC	African Union Commission	IDP	Internally displaced person
BRIC	Brazil, Russia, India and China	JAES	Joint Africa-EU Strategy
DAC	Development Assistance Committee of the OECD	LAC	Latin America and the Caribbean
DoL	Division of Labour	MDGs	Millennium Development Goals
EDF	European Development Fund	NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
EEAS	European External Action Service	ODA	Official Development Assistance
ENP	European Neighbourhood Policy	OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
EPA	Economic Partnership Agreement	PCD	Policy Coherence for Development

INFORMATION SOURCES

Information on ECDPM's work on ACP-EU cooperation
www.ecdpm.org

News and resources on the JAES
www.europafrica.org

Information on ACP-EU trade issues
www.acp-eu-trade.org

ECDPM's weekly e-newsletter
www.ecdpm.org/weeklycompass

ACP-EU Joint Parliamentary Assembly
www.europarl.europa.eu/intcoop/acp/10_o1/default_en.htm

ACP Secretariat
www.acpsec.org

African Union
www.africa-union.org

Official site of the Joint Africa-EU Strategy
www.africa-eu-partnership.org

European Commission, DG Development
http://ec.europa.eu/comm/development/index_en.htm

European Commission, EuropeAid Cooperation Office
http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/index_en.htm

European Commission, DG External Relations
http://ec.europa.eu/comm/external_relations/index.htm

European Union Trade Issues
http://ec.europa.eu/trade/issues/index_en.htm

European Parliament, Committee on Development
www.europarl.europa.eu/committees/deve_home_en.htm

Council of the European Union
www.consilium.europa.eu/cms3_fo/index.htm

Lisbon Treaty
http://europa.eu/lisbon_treaty/index_en.htm

Spanish EU Presidency
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