By Adam Higazi, Research Assistant on Political Dimensions of ACP-EU Cooperation, ECDPM. April 2003. This publication should be cited as: Dilemmas And Definitions In Post-Conflict Rehabilitation, Higazi, A. 2003. Maastricht : ECDPM 1

The proliferation of conflicts within the ACP has been a major cause of impoverishment and suffering, particularly in sub-Saharan Africa, and constitutes one of the major political and developmental challenges of ACP-EU cooperation. Conflict prevention, resolution and rehabilitation are addressed in article 11 of the Cotonou Partnership Agreement (CPA), which is some indication that at the level of policy-making conflict issues are now being taken more seriously. But even with this new policy framework in place, the challenge remains to put it into practice.

There are perhaps four key dilemmas which surface in the implementation of rehabilitation programmes, and these are explored in more detail below. The first dilemma is the question of when to engage, or the timing of a particular intervention; the second is the strategic approach needed to match the complexities of conflict; third is the institutional arrangements required for the effective implementation of policies; and fourth is ensuring a coherent political response to a given conflict at the level of the EU. These dilemmas do of course overlap: policy-makers must therefore address them in an integrated and coherent way. They are likely to be relevant areas of concern in development cooperation generally, but they are intensified during interventions in areas of conflict or in fragile states. This is particularly so for the European Commission (EC), a large donor with a complex organisational structure. If the EC is to respond effectively to conflicts there has to be good coordination among its different elements, and consistency between the decisions it makes at the supranational level with those made by intergovernmental bodies.

The discussion and analysis in this article is informed by a research project completed at the European Centre for Development Policy Management (ECDPM) in 2001 on the EC’s political and developmental responses to conflict-affected countries and fragile states. The project produced case studies on 6 ACP countries – namely, Congo, Rwanda, Burundi, Guinea-Bissau, Somalia, and Sudan. ² This work gave a detailed analysis of many of the successes and shortcomings of EU rehabilitation policies and their implementation in conflict-affected states. The research was enhanced by interviews - conducted at the field offices of the principal EU donors in each country, of members of governments, political organisations and civil society groups in or from the countries concerned, and of officials at the EC, in Member States, and at the UN. The findings of the case studies then formed the basis of a summary and operational guidance paper that was written jointly between ECDPM and International Alert. ³ The findings of this project are supplemented by those of an earlier paper written at ECDPM on the EC’s response to the crisis in Liberia. ⁴

When to engage? The message that emerged in all of the studies undertaken by ECDPM was that rehabilitation programmes should start as early as possible. This is necessary to address both the immediate humanitarian needs that arise from conflict and to support the longer processes of political, economic and social development that tackle the underlying causes of conflict and aim at resolution and stability. In this understanding, rehabilitation constitutes part of a broad strategy that addresses the different levels and patterns of conflict in both the short and long term. This means moving away from linear conceptions of conflict and rehabilitation, which in reality do not correspond to the complexities of conflict situations. What has been shown is the need to respond to situations of much greater volatility, where there are fluctuations in the intensity of violence both temporally and regionally, and where there’s a fine line between stability and renewed upheaval. For this reason the distinction between relief and development programming is artificial: rehabilitation should integrate the two. This helps to lessen disruptions in planning and funding during crises, and points to the need for a coherent response that starts early and which also incorporates conflict prevention into development policies. ⁵

One of the most successful instances of this ‘integrated’ strategy of rehabilitation was the intervention by the EC in the Liberian war. The war went through three main phases throughout the early to mid-1990s (the third phase was ended by the Abuja II Accords in 1996), but the EC intervention referred to here relates to the first Rehabilitation Programme for Liberia, implemented with considerable success between March 1994 and February 1998. The approach in this case was to ensure that the minimum conditions for stability and cooperation emerged through well targeted policies, rather than waiting for minimum conditions to be met at the outset. The implementation of EC rehabilitation policies helped to reduce conflict in Liberia by maintaining – and even launching – rehabilitation activities at peak emergency times. These targeted the principal causes of conflict and the main obstacles to the peace process, and were implemented in lieu of strategies set out in the National Indicative Programme that was drawn up from the Country Strategy Paper prior to the emergency. As the conflict became more serious the responsibilities of the National Authorising Officer were taken over by the EC’s Chief Authorising Officer, enabling the Desk Officer in the geographic unit in Brussels to coordinate the EU’s response. The basic principles of the strategy were a neutral approach and the stimulation of key services and infrastructures, both preconditions for a sustainable rehabilitation. The continued and increased engagement of the EC during the crisis also gave it more leverage in its mediation efforts to encourage a resolution and helped to enable cooperation from Member States.


Strategic considerations are the second dilemma of rehabilitation; in particular the adaptations that are needed to link relief, rehabilitation and development (LRRD) in the challenging environment of fragile states. This calls for systematic and ongoing ‘political dialogue’ with governments and non-state actors (NSAs) to assess the situation and identify adequate response strategies at different stages of the conflict (as foreseen by article 8 of the CPA). Strategic planning is needed, but this is best served by a broad framework approach – not by the kind of detailed programming where all activities and expected results are specified and intricately mapped out. The strategic framework that is adopted must be multi-dimensional – to ensure that it incorporates different actors and addresses the different levels of conflict – and flexible, to allow for quick responses to what are often rapidly changing situations. Policies should of course be implemented in accordance with the specific needs of the different people and regions affected by conflict.

A participatory approach to keep track of changing needs among the population is also essential, as weak or collapsed state structures cannot usually direct aid to the sections of the population where it is most needed. Technical and financial assistance, as well as humanitarian relief, therefore have to be directed mainly through local actors. This normally calls for a local-level presence on the part of the donor. The wide spread of EC Delegations in the ACP and its connections to local and international NGOs should mean that decentralised cooperation and participation strategies are a strength of EC rehabilitation efforts, but in fact performance has been very mixed in this area. Current moves to ‘deconcentrate’ decision-making procedures, which should give more autonomy to Delegations, are therefore to be welcomed. Furthermore, the framework of the CPA, with its inclusion of NSAs in development cooperation, should be used as an incentive to support a more structured dialogue and involvement of NSAs in rehabilitation efforts. The combination of decentralisation and local-level participation is perhaps the best means of promoting capacity development, which is essential for the ongoing process of rehabilitation, during and after conflict.

In the ECDPM case studies there were several examples of EC decentralised cooperation strategies that have already been put in place. For example, in Congo, the European Community Humanitarian Office (ECHO) has been funding ILD programmes – ‘Initiatives Locales de Développement’ – and local health committees. In Rwanda the EC channelled resources directly to the prefecture and commune level, but maintained total programming autonomy, and a similar approach was also adopted in Burundi. One of the main difficulties in conflict and post-conflict states, however, is finding suitable local actors to work with. This may be due to damage done to the capacity and functioning of civil society organisations during conflict, highlighting the need to link participation to capacity-building measures. But part of the problem arises from the need for an inclusive partnership – one that attempts to bring together different local actors on an equal basis. This is an important part of the peace-building process in conflict-affected countries, but can be very difficult to achieve because civil society groups and local governments are often polarised. Participatory approaches therefore encounter problems that have to be managed very carefully: there is a fine line between policies that reduce tensions and those that inflame them.

A further challenge is that for the implementation of decentralised approaches there will usually need to be some level of cooperation from state or regional authorities as well. This has been one of the problems faced by the EC during its operations in Sudan, a complex and long-running political emergency. Whilst the EU suspended Official Development Assistance to Sudan in 1990, it has continued to provide humanitarian aid through ECHO, often in the ‘grey zone’ between relief and rehabilitation. ⁶ In the North the Government of Sudan (GoS), and in the South the main opposition group, the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A), have tried to establish leverage over donor activities. Both the GoS and the SPLM have had vested interests in the way that humanitarian operations have been conducted. This has raised dilemmas in terms of how best to respond to unwarranted political interference - particularly awkward to resolve because both engagement with the ‘authorities’ and the disengagement (which can mean the withdrawal of operations) can have very negative humanitarian implications. In Sudan things have been further complicated because it is a divided country where only the GoS has formal political recognition (for example, it is the representative of Sudan at the UN) - and yet it has little control over the South, where the SPLM/A has de facto authority. The GoS closely controls donor activities in the North through the Humanitarian Assistance Committee (HAC) whilst the SPLM has set up a humanitarian wing, the South Sudan Relief and Rehabilitation Association (SRRA), to try and control international relief work in southern areas.

The GoS has in the past broken agreements that it has made with donor agencies and NGOs – its commitments through the HAC and to the scheme Operation Lifeline Sudan (OLS) – by frequently blocking aid flights to the South. For its part, the SPLM undertook long consultations with humanitarian agencies and then issued a ‘Memorandum of Understanding’ (MoU) that was supposed to be signed by all implementing organisations active in south Sudan as an instrument to govern assistance more clearly. This stipulated the conditions under which agencies could operate, but in doing so breached the customary principles of neutrality and independence of relief operations. An agreement whereby the SPLM would be able to levy taxes on humanitarian operations (including relief flights), hire and fire staff, and vet projects was not acceptable for most of the humanitarian agencies. Meanwhile, the non-signing of the MoU meant that the security that the SPLM/A was supposed to provide to the implementing organisations would be lost. In 2000, when the SPLM eventually threatened to evict and subsequently ousted those humanitarian agencies that wouldn't sign the MoU, the EC decided to suspend funding from SPLM controlled areas, but continued to fund in the other areas of southern Sudan not controlled by the SPLM/A at the time – mostly in the Upper Nile region. When the MoU was not in the end applied to the letter by the SPLM, in 2001 ECHO gradually resumed its funding for humanitarian efforts in south Sudan, where finally most humanitarian actors signed the MoU, and from 2002 ECHO has again been funding assistance in all areas of southern Sudan.

As Lehtinen (2001:17) has written, ‘[T]he issue of the MoU has highlighted the problem of how to deal with local ‘authorities’ at a minimum level, without legitimising them politically.’ This has indeed been an acute strategic dilemma in Sudan, but in various ways it is a problem encountered in most interventions in conflict-affected/fragile states. Furthermore, dilemmas of political engagement are also inherent in capacity-building, for although this is an essential aspect of the rehabilitation process, the structures to be supported must have some degree of legitimacy. Nonetheless, as policies elsewhere have shown (most notably in Liberia), ‘constructive engagement’ and carefully targeted measures can produce positive outcomes with respect to the strengthening of both governance and civil society. Capacity-building without political recognition remains a very major challenge in Sudan, but it may be that where humanitarian/development strategies can co-opt rather than undermine civil society and local-government structures, sustainable rehabilitation could become more of a possibility. It does seem that in this respect the EC has begun to move away from past policies where responses to the crises in Sudan focused more or less exclusively on the delivery of humanitarian aid. Whilst such aid has been crucial for the survival of large numbers of people, it is not in itself an adequate response to a complex humanitarian emergency (see Lehtinen, 2001: 21). Short-term humanitarian aid does not allow for the capacity building of local actors, nor long-term development planning by NGOs. Worse still, in Sudan aid has been manipulated as a weapon of war by all sides in the conflict. A more integrated strategy is needed that also paves the way for rehabilitation; current EC strategies - especially the Humanitarian Plus Programme but also the EU-Sudan Political Dialogue – perhaps reflect a shift in this direction.

A further dimension of rehabilitation strategies is that they often need to be regional in scope. Conflicts tend to spill over borders, therefore their regional fallout needs to be addressed, but equally the causes of conflict frequently have important regional aspects. In Sudan, the case for both a regional and multilateral approach to rehabilitation is indicated by measures needed to address the flow of refugees into Kenya and rebel groups into northern Uganda, water resource issues with Egypt, and the possible fuelling of the war through the investments by foreign oil companies in southern Sudan. A regional response implies good coordination between actors that spans the geographic and social divisions of Sudan. In particular, this has to take place between donor agencies split between Khartoum and Nairobi. The impact of the conflict on neighbouring countries and the role that they may have in its resolution is also very important. Dialogue and peace-building initiatives along these lines have taken place through the multilateral framework of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) and were made evident in the Machakos Protocol of July 2002. ⁷

Institutional organisation constitutes the third dilemma, in the sense of the specific institutional qualities and adaptations that are required for rehabilitation strategies to be effectively implemented. In a nutshell, these are flexibility, responsiveness, and very high levels of coordination between units and between policy-makers at different levels. It is especially important that institutional arrangements are in place that allow for effective responses to changing situations ‘on the ground’, and where comprehensive regional strategies for rehabilitation can be coordinated. In the case of the EC there is a need for more integrated institutional responses to conflict. ⁸ This is most difficult to achieve in divided countries - as in Sudan where the necessity of separate mandates has hampered an integrated approach between the EC Delegation in Khartoum and ECHO in Nairobi, and between DG DEV and ECHO in Brussels. ⁹

Similar difficulties have been encountered in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), where the response has been focused through ECHO in the east and EDF programmes in the west. The problem here is that the division in the EC’s response between east and west DRC has not been based on a ‘needs assessment’, but is due to ‘the lack of an adaptable mechanism for disbursing aid in rebel-held territories’ (Bourque and Sampson, 2001: 29). Furthermore, the EC’s response to the war in the DRC has also lacked coordination at the regional level – but in fact, no single donor has managed to address all levels of crises in the DRC. ¹⁰ In particular, inter-communitarian conflicts have received scarce attention, despite the destruction that they have caused. Some of these connect to inter-communitarian conflicts with their roots beyond the borders of the DRC - most prominent here are the Interahamwe Hutu militias which crossed into the DRC from Rwanda. By and large, conflict in the DRC has been fuelled by the involvement of armies from surrounding countries in the fighting, so that although the fighting has taken place on the territory of the DRC, it has in another sense been a truly regional conflagration. There does seem to be a regional awareness in the political initiatives of the EC – ‘solutions without borders must be found to problems without borders’ (Bourque and Sampson, 2001: 10) – however, it has seemingly proved difficult to translate this into a strong regional approach to the coordination of aid delivery and rehabilitation. Moreover, development initiatives of the EC have not been backed up strongly enough with the political pressure that needs to be exerted at the governmental level, on the multitude of countries with a stake in Congo’s war.

Ensuring a coherent political response at the level of the EU is the fourth dilemma that is faced in rehabilitation programming, for ultimately, without political back-up – within the Commission or from amongst Member States - there can be no EU response at all. Development practitioners can be heroes in the field but their work also has to be valued by political decision-makers at the centre, otherwise it will be seriously constrained. This highlights the fact that rehabilitation policies need to be integrated at many different levels, with interventions located within a broader political framework. Many of the problems that often emerge here are the result of tensions between development goals and foreign policies. This is what happens in cases where the strategic interests of donors differs from the development or humanitarian needs of the country affected by conflict. Within the EU this is further complicated by the lack of coherence between the foreign policy objectives of different Member States. In particular, this suggests the need for more cooperation within the framework of the Common Foreign and Security Policy, and a clearer role for the CFSP in relation to conflict intervention and rehabilitation. But this is something that the Commission has often had problems with, especially where rehabilitation projects are financed using EDF money, the flows of which can be disrupted in cases of disagreement amongst members of the EDF Committee (an intergovernmental body). In the context of the CPA, this perhaps indicates the need for more cooperation with ACP countries, so that at least decision-making can be made with leaders from whichever region is affected.

All of this points to the need for a higher tolerance of risk than would be expected in other types of development programmes. Risks need to be taken into account in performance criteria and indicators. Management procedures have to be adapted so that risk is accepted but at the same time minimised without losing operational effectiveness. This can be a difficult balance to achieve, particularly in cases of media and public scrutiny where immediate, concrete results are often expected. Part of the problem here consists of judging and then communicating the effectiveness of rehabilitation in light of the difficult operational context in which it takes place. Clearly, achievements have to be seen as relative to the general circumstances of a situation rather than assessed in any absolute terms, but if progress is to be made in the implementation of rehabilitation strategies then innovative solutions are probably needed.

Please address any remarks or observations with regard to this paper to Adam Higazi (ah@ecdpm.org)